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1 .  Introduction 
A familiar idea about gradable adjectives is that they denote relations between 
individuals and degrees. This is most transparent in constructions like ( 1 ), where 
we seem to be witnessing explicit reference to or quantification over degrees. 
( 1 )  a .  John i s  six feet tall . 
b . He is that tall . 
c . How tall is he? 
d .  However tall he is, . . .  
A sentence like ( l )a can be analyzed very simply: tall denotes a relation between 
physical objects and degrees of height, John and six feet denote respectively an 
individual and a degree, and the whole thing (ignoring the vacuous copula) is 
hierarchically structured and compositionally interpreted just like an ordinary 
transitive sentence. The adjective's degree argument appears to be syntactically 
projected, just like the individual argument, and interpreted in an analogous 
fashion. 
Argument positions where an individual is selected may be occupied by 
referential DPs as well as by quantificational DPs. How about argument positions 
for degrees? Do we also sometimes find quantificational degree arguments in the 
same slots as referential ones? This indeed is a plausible diagnosis of what goes 
on in gradation constructions like (2) . 
(2) a. He is more than 4 feet tall. 
b .  He is taller than 4 feet. 
c. He is taller than the bed is long. 
d .  He is as tall as you are. 
e. He is tallest . 
f He is too tall . 
(2)a, for example, could be paraphrased as 'he is tall to some degree exceeding 4 
feet', with an explicit indefinite description (existential quantifier) over degrees. 
This kind of analysis can be given for all these examples: the underlined phrase in 
each example is a generalized quantifier over degrees that is generated in the 
same argument position occupied by the degree name six feet in ( 1  )a. In those 
cases where that phrase is superficially discontinuous, we can attribute this to an 
( obligatory) superficial extraposition process which does not feed LF. 1 
Quantificational DPs are not always interpretable in the argument 
positions where they are generated, and so they move, sometimes covertly, to 
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appropriate scope posltlOns. There are island constraints on this movement, but 
within their limits, a certain amount of freedom. Sometimes a DP-quantifier has 
more than one available landing-site, and sometimes this choice gives rise to 
truth-conditional ambiguities (known as " scope ambiguities") .  Does the analogy 
between individual and degree arguments extend to this phenomenon as well? Do 
we find ambiguities that are due to multiple scope options for degree quantifiers 
like the ones in (2)? This is the question I want to address in this paper. 
In doing so, I will follow in the footsteps of Christopher Kennedy, who 
discussed the same question in his 1 997 thesis .  Kennedy came to a negative 
conclusion. He argued that the putative degree quantifiers in comparative 
constructions always take the narrowest possible scope - even when no known 
locality condition would seem to prevent them from scoping over another 
operator in their vicinity. He suggests that this fact is unexpected and mysterious 
if the constructions in question really do contain a constituent that is a degree 
quantifier and moves for interpretability. For this (and other) reasons he endorses 
a different LF-constituency (and semantics) for gradation structures, in which 
there is no degree-quantifier that needs to or is able to move in the first place. 
My aim in this paper is modest and merely descriptive. I want to argue 
that the facts are more complicated than Kennedy concluded. In a limited set of 
environments, the multiple scope-options anticipated by the approach I have 
sketched do show up as truth-conditional ambiguities. Moreover, the interpretive 
options for various kinds of elided or implicit material give indirect evidence for 
two possible scope constellations even in certain cases where they truth­
conditionally collapse. I will tentatively conclude that gradation constructions do 
contain degree quantifiers that take scope by movement, though this movement is 
subject to (severe) syntactic constraints .  I have no proposal yet about the nature 
of these constraints. 
Let me begin by presenting a more concrete version of the degree­
quantifier analysis of comparatives that I have hinted at . Unfortunately, quite a 
few distinct variants are suggested by the existing literature on comparatives, and 
I do not have space in this paper to motivate the specific choices I make or to 
prove that they don't affect my points. I will assume that gradable adjectives 
denote functions of type <d,et>2 which are monotone in the sense of (3) .  A 
sample lexical entry is (4) . 
(3) A function f of type <d,et> is monotone iff 
'v'x'v'd'v'd' [f(d)(x) = 1 & d' < d � f(d')(x) = 1 ] 
(4) [ta//] = Add. AXe. x is tall to degree d 
The adjective's degree argument is its inner argument; it is syntactically projected 
as sister to A and will be labeled DegP.3 In the simplest kind of case (e.g.  ( 1 )a,b), 
the DegP has a meaning of type d and is straightforwardly interpretable in situ (by 
functional application) . In the more complicated cases which we will mostly be 
concerned with, the DegP is a generalized quantifier over degrees (type <dt,t» . 
This is the case for complex DegPs headed by -er, as, too etc . ,  e .g . , -er than 6 
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feet, -er than Mary is tall, 5 inches -er than that. I will abstract away as much as 
possible from issues concerning the internal structure and composition of these 
complex DegPs. Until we get to sections 2 .4 and 3 below, we can limit ourselves 
to examples in which the phrase after than rigidly designates a degree. The kinds 
of meanings I will assume for this case are defined in (5), assuming the definition 
of "maximum" in (6) . 
(5) a. lE-er than one foot] = AP<d,t>. max(p) > l '  
b .  [exactly two inches -er than one foot] = AP. max(p) = l '  + 2 "  
(6) max(p) := td. P( d) = 1 & 'if d'[P( d') = 1 � d' :S d] 
Being of type <dt,t>, these complex DegPs cannot be interpreted in situ, but must 
move for interpretability to a position above the adjective's subject (not 
necessarily above the surface subject, if there are lower covert subjects) . The 
movement leaves a trace of type d and creates a A-abstract of type <d, t>, which 
makes a suitable argument to the DegP. Here is a sample derivation. 
(7) John is taller than 4 feet. 
SS minus extraposition: John is [AP [DegP -er than 4 fi] tall] 
LF: [DegP -er than 4 fiJ I John is [AP tl tall] 
interpretation4 : max { d :  tallfj,d) }  > 4' 
So John is taller than 4 feet is true iff the maximal degree to which John is tall 
exceeds 4 feet. 
2. DegP-scope and truth-conditions 
In the syntax and semantics just presented, I deliberately highlighted a close 
analogy between DegPs and DPs.  In both categories, we find referring (and 
bound variable) phrases with denotations of a basic type (d or e) as well as 
quantificational phrases of the corresponding generalized quantifier type « dt, t> 
or <et,t» . And in both, the quantificational phrases can move at LF, leaving 
behind basic-type traces and creating complex A-predicates. In the case of DPs, 
this movement is known as QR (Quantifier Raising) and is standardly assumed to 
be the source of truth-conditional ambiguities. If DegPs are so similar in their 
LF -syntax and semantics, shouldn't we find analogous scope-ambiguities due to 
multiple choices of landing-sites for DegP-movement? For example, when a 
DegP originates in the surface-c-command domain of a quantificational DP, 
negation, or intensional predicate, it should be able to scope either below or above 
that item - at least as long as there is nothing in its path that is known to create 
islands for movement. In the present section, we try to test this prediction, by 
comparing the range of truth-conditionally distinct readings that we can generate 
by DegP-movement in our system with the readings that are actually possible. 5 
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2. 1. Caveat: systematic equivalences and anomalies 
Not every scope ambiguity is a truth-conditional ambiguity. For example, when 
every boy scopes above every girl in the sentence Every girl saw every boy, the 
truth-conditions are just the same as when it scopes below it . The methodological 
implications of this fact are familiar. If we want to study the properties of QR, we 
must choose our examples judiciously. The fact that this particular sentence has 
only one interpretation doesn't show that objects can't move over subjects. 
When it comes to quantifiers over degrees rather than ordinary 
individuals, this point is especially pertinent. Due to the ordered structure of the 
domain of degrees and the monotonicity property of adjective meanings, there 
are lots of cases where the relative scopes of a DegP and another quantifier are 
indistinguishable. To get a feel for what I am talking about, consider a 
comparative with a universal subject DP. 
(8) Every girl is taller than 4 feet. 
If the DegP -er than 4 ft is free to scope either below or above the subject, we 
have two LFs: a 10w-DegP LF as in (9)a and a high-DegP LF as in (9)b. 
(9) a. [every girlh [-er than 4 fth tl is t2 tall 
b .  [-er than 4 fth [every girlh tl is  t2 tall 
On the semantics specified above, these structures get the truth-conditions in 
( l O)a,b respectively. 
( 1 0) a. Vx[girl(x) � max { d: tall(x,d)} > 4'] 
b .  max{d: Vx[girl(x) � tall(x,d)] }  > 4' 
( I O)a says that each girl's (maximal) height is above 4'. ( I O)b is less transparent 
at first : We form the set of degrees d such that every girl is tall to d .  Given the 
monotonicity of the tall-relation, this is precisely the set of degrees to which the 
shortest girl is tall (or the shortest girls, if two or more are tied for shortest) . So 
the maximum of that is the (maximal) height of the shortest girl(s), and ( l O)b says 
this is above 4' . But that's the same claim as ( l O)a! If every girl is taller than 4', 
than the shortest girl is, and if the shortest girl is taller than 4', then every girl is. 
Something similar happens when the subject is an existential quantifier. If 
we construct two LFs for ( 1 1 )  analogous to the ones in (9)a,b, we derive the truth­
conditions in ( I2)a,b. 
( 1 1 )  Some girl i s  taller than 4 feet. 
( 12) a. 3x[girl(x) & max{ d: tall(x,d) } > 4'] 
b. max { d :  3x[girl(x) & tall(x,d)] }  > 4' 
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In ( 1 2)b, we have the set of degrees d such that some girl is tall to d. This turns 
out to be the set of degrees to which the tallest girl is tall (or the tallest girls in the 
event of a tie) . So ( 12)b says that the (maximal) height of the tallest girl(s) is 
above 4' . But if some girl is taller than 4', then the tallest one is, and if the tallest 
girl is taller than 4', then some girl is. So again ( 1 2)b winds up equivalent to 
( 12)a.6 
How pervasive is this kind of equivalence? Quite. It generalizes from 
comparatives to equatives. 7 It generalizes from universal and existential to all 
monotone increasing quantifiers. And it generalizes from quantifiers over 
individuals to quantifiers over possible worlds. This means that we would be 
wasting our time trying to detect scope-ambiguities not only in examples like (8) 
and ( 1 1 ), but in any of the following as well . 
( 1 3 )  a. Every girl is as tall as John is. 
b. Some girl is as tall as John is. 
( 14) a. More than 20 girls are taller than 4 feet. 
b .  Most of the papers are longer than 5 pages .  
( 1 5) a. The paper is required to be longer than 10 pages .  
b .  The paper i s  allowed to  be  longer than 1 0  pages .  
Pick ( 1 5)a, for instance. required i s  a necessity operator, a universal quantifier 
over the set of accessible worlds (for some contextually given accessibility 
relation, plausibly here a deontic one) . If the DegP -er than 5 pp scopes below 
required, our semantics delivers the truth-condition in ( 1 6)a, if the DegP scopes 
above required, we predict ( 16)b . 8 
( 1 6) a. \;/w E Acc: max{ d :  longw(p,d) } > l Opp 
b .  max{d :  \;/w E Acc: longw(p,d)} > 1 0pp 
( 1 6)a transparently says that the paper is longer than l Opp in every accessible 
world. ( 1 6)b instructs us to determine the maximal degree to which the paper is 
long in every accessible world. That is its (maximal) length in those accessible 
worlds where it is shortest (the 'minimal compliance' worlds, so to speak) . This, 
( 1 6)b says, exceeds l Opp - which is tantamount to ( 1 6)a, since if the paper 
exceeds 1 0pp in the accessible worlds where it's shortest, it exceeds 1 0pp in every 
accessible world, and vice versa. The reasoning is just as for every girl in (8) .  By 
the same token, the possiblity operator allowed in ( 1 5)b behaves just like some 
girl in ( 1 1 ) .  I leave it to the reader to establish the pertinent equivalences for the 
remaining examples. 
So what have we learned so far about DegP-movement? Nothing yet. 
The examples we have analyzed here are consistent with everything we have 
assumed plus the assumption that DegP can move to any position where it is 
interpretable. They are also consistent with the possibility that DegP never moves 
beyond the lowest position where it is interpretable. We just couldn't tell . 
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Our next set of examples will still not allow us to tell how far DegPs can 
move, but this time for a different reason. The high-DegP LF will not be 
equivalent to the 10w-DegP LF, but it will b� semantically deviant and thus ruled 
out by independent principles. Consider scoping a DegP over a negation, as in the 
second LF given below for sentence ( 1 7)a. 
( 1 7) a. Mary isn't taller than 4 feet 
b .  not [-er than 4'] Mary i s  t tall 
-, max{d :  tall(m,d)} > 4 ft 
c. [ -er than 4'] not [Mary is t tall] 
# max{d :  --, tall(m,d) } > 4 ft 
The predicted interpretation for ( 1 7)c refers to the maximum of the set of degrees 
to which Mary isn't tall . But that set has no maximum. 9 So if such an LF can be 
generated, it is a presupposition failure. Plausibly, this suffices to explain why 
only one reading (the one in ( 1 7)b) is attested. For all we know, ( 1 7)c may or 
may not be generated by the syntax; even if it is, it will be filtered out. 
This observation generalizes from plain negation to other implicitly 
negative or monotone decreasing operators. 
( 1 8) a. At most two girls are taller than 5 feet. 
b .  [at most two girlsh [-er than 5 'h tl  are t2 tall 
I {x: girl(x) & max{d :  tall(x,d) } > 5 ' } 1 ::s 2 
c. [-er than 5'h [at most two girlsh t l  are t2 tall 
# max {d:  \ {x :  girl(x) & tall(x,d) } \ ::s 2} > 5 '  
( 1 9) a. (Mary works 60 hrs a week, and) she refuses to work harder than that. 
b .  she refuses [ [-er than that] PRO to work t hard] 
Vw E Acc: --, max {d :  m works d-hard in w} > 60hrs/wk 
c. [ -er than that] she refuses PRO to work t hard 
# max{d :  Vw E Acc: --, m works d-hard in w} > 60hrs/wk 
As the reader can verify, the b-LFs capture the (only) available readings, and the 
c-LFs refer to undefined maxima. 
If scoping over upward monotone operators always gives equivalent 
readings, and scoping over downward monotone ones always implies 
presupposition failure, we are left with the non-monotone ones. 
(20) a. Exactly two girls are taller than 5 feet. 
b .  [exactly two girlsh [-er than 5'h t l  are t2 tall 
I {x: girl(x) & max{d:  tall(x,d) } > 5 ' } 1  = 2 
c .  [ -er than 5 'h [exactly two girls] 1 t 1 are t2 tall 
max{d:  \ {x: girl(x) & tall(x,d) } \ = 2 } > 5 '  
The maximum referred to in (20)c turns out to be well-defined. In fact, the 
maximal degree to which exactly two girls are tall coincides with the maximal 
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degree to which at least two girls are tall . So here we finally seem to have found 
a case that tells us something. The fact is that sentence (20)a unambiguously 
means (20)b and does not share a reading with the sentence At least two girls are 
taller than 5 feet. But if DegP is allowed to scope over the quantifier, as in (20)c, 
then such a reading is generated. So the analysis makes inadequate empirical 
predictions unless supplemented -by some constraint on DegP-movement. 
This is a fine argument given the assumptions I have adopted in this paper. 
It may not go through, however, in the context of a more comprehensive theory 
which incorporates an account of polar opposition along the lines of Bierwisch 
( 1 987) and Kennedy ( 1 998). Briefly, (20)c may be ruled out by an independently 
motivated prohibition against sets of degrees which fail to be initial or final 
segments of the scale. Not being able to go into this, I leave it open here whether 
non-monotone operators can tell us anything about DegP-movement. lO 
2. 2. Exactly-difjerentials, less-comparatives, and Kennedy's generalization 
The equivalences observed in 2.  1 hold for simple comparatives (and equatives) 
and also for comparatives with simple differential phrases, but they no longer 
hold for comparatives with a differential phrase containing at most or exactly (or 
for equatives modified by at most or exactly) . Nor do they hold when we switch 
from more-comparatives to less-comparatives. For instance, we saw that if the 
shortest girl is taller than John, then every girl is . But if the shortest girl is exactly 
one inch taller than John, it doesn't follow that every girl is . And if the shortest 
girl is less tall than John, it also doesn't follow that every girl is. These and 
analogous non-equivalences will enable us to construct examples where the low­
DegP and high-DegP LFs have clearly distinct yet equally non-deviant truth­
conditions, and where we can thus get empirical evidence about the availability of 
each LF. 
Starting with exactly-differentials, consider the sentences in (2 1 )a and 
(22)a and their predicted truth-conditions for LFs with low DegPs (b) and high 
DegPs (c) . 
(2 1 )  a. (John is 4' tall . )  Some girl is exactly 1 I I  taller than that . 
b. [some girlh [exactly 1 I I  -er than 4'h tl is t2 tall 
:lx[girl(x) & max {d :  tall(x,d) } = 4' + 1 " ]  
c .  [exactly 1 I I  -er than 4'h [some girlh tl is t2 tall 
max { d: :lx[girl(x) & tall(x,d)] } = 4' + 1 II 
(22) a. ( . . .  ) Every girl is exactly 1 II taller than that. 
b. Vx[girl(x) � max { d: tall(x,d) } = 4' + 1 " ]  
c .  max { d :  Vx[girl(x) � ta11(x,d)] }  = 4' + 1 I I  
The sentences are judged unambiguous, and the b-LFs correctly represent their 
intuitive meanings. What about the c-LFs? (2 1 )c says, in effect, that the tallest 
girl is exactly 4' 1 ", which appears not to be a possible reading. Since it is a 
stronger claim than (2 1 )b, though, it is a bit hard to prove that it's not an alternate 
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reading. (Speakers may be reluctant to call something false when it's true on 
another reading.) But with the universal example (22)a, we don't have this 
methodological problem. (22)c expresses a weaker claim than (22)b. So we can 
construct scenarios in which c is true while b is false : just imagine that the 
shortest girl is exactly 4' 1 "  but some other girls are taller. If c were a possible 
reading of the English sentence, then speakers should sometimes be willing to 
judge it true in this situation. But it clearly is false. So (22)c cannot be a 
grammatical LF. The DegP apparently cannot scope over the quantificational DP. 
Test cases with less lead to the same conclusion. Let us first make explicit 
the meaning of less-headed DegPs. The obvious rule is (23), which differs from 
the rule for -er just in the reversal of the >-relation. 
(23) lJ.less than one/oot] = A.P<d,t>. max(p) < I ' 
Now consider 10w-DegP and high-DegP derivations for the sentence in (24)a. 
(24) a. (John is 4' tall . )  Every girl is less tall than that. 
b .  [every girlh [less than 4 'h tl is t2 tall 
V'x[girl(x) � max{d :  tall(x,d) } < 4'] 
c. [less than 4'h [every girl] 1 tl is t2 tall 
max { d: V'x[girl(x) � tall(x,d)] } < 4' 
(24)b transparently captures the intuitive meaning of the sentence. (24)c says that 
the shortest girl is less than 4' tall, which is a weaker claim than b and clearly not 
an available reading. Again, we must conclude that DegP doesn't scope over DP. 
This holds not only for DPs in subject position. (25) has a universally 
quantified object, but still the DegP seems unable to scope over it . 
(25) (The frostline is 3 and half feet deep .) Mary set every post exactly 2 feet 
deeper than that. 
If exactly 2 '  -er than that took scope over every post, the sentence would be true if 
Mary set just the least deep post exactly 2' below the frostline, but she set the 
other posts deeper. Intuitively, (25) is false in this case. Even in (26), where the 
quantified DP is an internal argument and to the right of the graded adjective, the 
DegP cannot scope over it . 
(26) (John gave every candidate an A.) ?Mary was less impressed with every 
candidate than that. 
This cannot be true just because the candidate who impressed Mary the least 
didn't impress her enough to get an A. The generalization appears to be the one in 
(27), which I will refer to as "Kennedy's generalization" . 
(27) If the scope of a quantificational DP contains the trace of a DegP, it also 
contains that DegP itself 1 1  
47 
48 Irene Heim 
The most reasonable diagnosis at this point is that (27) holds generally, not just 
for the examples in this section, where DegP-scope happened to affect truth­
conditions. The examples in the previous section, where high DegPs yielded 
interpretations that were either truth-conditionally equivalent to low DegPs or 
semantically deviant, did not provide evidence for (27) . But they were, of course, 
consistent with it as well . 
2. 3. Intensional verbs and Stateva's argument 
In the last section we only looked at DegP-scope in relation to DP-quantifiers. 
What about intensional verbs? The logical point is the same: when we add 
exactry-differentials or switch form more to less, we ensure non-equivalence 
between low and high DegPs. Let ' s  look at some examples and their predicted 
readings. 
(28) a. (This draft is 1 0  pages.) The paper is required to be exactly 5 pages 
longer than that. 
b. required [ [exactly 5 pp . -er than that] the paper be t long] 
Vw E Acc: max{d :  longw(p,d) } = 1 5pp 
c .  [exactly 5 pp. -er than that] [required [the paper be t long]] 
max{d :  Vw E Acc: longw(p,d)} = 1 5pp 
(28)b says that the paper is exactly 1 5pp long in every acceptable world. This 
implies that it is not allowed to be longer than 1 5pp. (28)c says that the paper is 
exactly 1 5pp long in those acceptable worlds where it is shortest .  This leaves 
open whether it might also be allowed to be longer than 1 5pp. The English 
sentence (28)a can be understood in either one of these two ways. It seems to be 
ambiguous, in just the way that we predict if the DegP can move either below or 
above the necessity operator. The same thing happens with a possibility operator. 
(29) a. ( . . .  1 0  pp) The paper is allowed to be exactly 5 pages longer than that. 
b .  :Jw E Acc: max{d :  longw(p,d)} = 1 5pp 
c .  max{d : :Jw E Acc: longw(p,d) } = 1 5pp 
(29)b says that the paper is exactly 1 5pp in some acceptable worlds, leaving it 
open that it might also be allowed to be other lengths. (29)c says it is exactly 
1 5pp long in the acceptable worlds where it is longest, which means it is not 
allowed to be longer than 1 5pp. Again, these two distinct readings are both 
available for the English sentence (29)a. 
Examples of intensional verbs with less-comparatives make the same 
point, as previously argued by Stateva ( 1 999) . 12 
(30) a. The paper is required to be less long than that. 
b .  required [ [less than that] the paper be  t long] 
Vw E Acc:  max{d :  longw(p,d)} < lOpp 
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c. [less than that] [required [the paper be t long] ] 
max{d :  Vw E Acc: longw(p,d) } < l Opp 
(30)b says that the paper is less than 1 0pp in every acceptable world; so it ' s  not 
allowed to be longer. But c says merely that it is less than 1 0pp in the acceptable 
worlds where it ' s  shortest. c is equivalent to 'the paper is not required to be as 
long as that' . Both of these clearly distinct readings are available. Similarly for 
the possibility sentence :  
(3 1 )  a. ( . . .  10 pp) The paper is allowed to be less long than that. 
b .  3w E Acc: max{d :  longw(p,d)} < l Opp 
c. max { d :  3w E Acc: 10ngwCp,d)} < l Opp 
(3 1 )c, which means that the paper is not allowed to be as long as 1 0pp, is a 
possible reading for (3 1 )a. 
The availability of the c-readings in these examples indicates that DegP is 
not, after all, always confined to its narrowest possible scope. Intervening 
intensional verbs seem to differ from intervening quantificational DPs in this 
respect, and Kennedy' s generalization does not carry over to them. 
Or is there a different explanation for these ambiguities? These 
intensional verbs are known to participate in another strange phenomenon, the so­
called scope-splitting of negative and other non-monotone-increasing 
quantifiers. 1 For example, No deposit is required means that it is not necessary 
to make a deposit, and At most three attempts are allowed means that it is not 
permitted to make more than three attempts .  Maybe the c-readings of our 
comparative examples above are obtained not by DegP-movement, but by the 
same mechanism that splits scope in these cases. But what is that mechanism? 
Scope-splitting phenomena are not well understood and their analysis is 
controversial. One approach involves decomposition into a wide-scope negation 
and a narrow-scope residue, e .g .  no deposit = NEG + a deposit, at most three 
attempts = NEG + more than three attempts, exactly 5pp -er than that = NEG + 
more than 5pp -er than that, less than that = NEG + as as that. But these 
decompositions are not all morphologically transparent (e.g . ,  the last one involves 
a switch from the comparative to its dual, the equative) . Another idea is to split 
off different wide-scope pieces in different cases, negation in some, focus­
sensitive adverbs like only, exactly in others. But this would not seem to cover 
the less-cases. What I would like to suggest instead is that scope-splitting (at least 
sometimes) is DegP-movement. So I agree that the two phenomena are the same, 
but I question that there is a good analysis of scope-splitting that is a genuine 
alternative to DegP-scoping. Much more work is required to substantiate this 
suggestion. But assuming that I am on the right track with this, I tentatively 
conclude (with Stateva) that DegPs are able to scope over intensional verbs. 
Does this hold for all intensional verbs? A wider range of examples 
reveals a mixed pattern. A few more verbs act just like require and allow, e.g. 
need and be able . (32)a,b are ambiguous in the same way as our examples above, 
and in particular permit the indicated high-DegP readings .  
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(32) a. John is able to run less fast than that . 
'he is not able to run as fast as that' 
b .  The paper needs to be exactly 5 pp longer than that. 
'the paper's required minumum length is exactly 5pp longer than that' 
But the verbs below behave differently in that the high-DegP readings indicated 
are not attested. 
(3 3)  The paper might be less long than that. 
*' it's not possible for it to be as long as that' 
(34) a. The paper should be less long than that. 
*' it's not required for it to be as long as that' 
b .  The paper is supposed to be less long than that. 
* 'it's not required for it to be as long as that' 
c .  I want the paper to be less long than that. 
*' I don't require it to be as long as that' 
Why the difference? There are two imaginable reasons. Either the intensional 
verbs in (33)  and (34) just don't allow the DegP to move over them. Or there is 
something in their semantics that masks the truth-conditional effect of this 
movement. The second kind of explanation would be more interesting. I 
speculate that it is the right one for at least a subset of these examples. 14  Notice 
that all the verbs in (34) are so-called neg-raising verbs :  their outer negations are 
systematically understood as inner negations. For example, the paper shouldn 't 
be coauthored means that it should be non-coauthored, and I don 't want the paper 
to be coauthored means that I want it not to be coauthored. Could that have 
something to do with why the readings in (34) fail to surface? 
Here is a very preliminary attempt to make such a connection. Suppose 
that "neg-raising" is due to a kind of excluded-middle presupposition1 5 : when we 
assert that x wants p, we presuppose that XiS desires regarding p are determinate 
one way or the other, i .e . ,  that x either wants p or wants not-p o Since the 
presupposition is inherited under negation, 'x doesn't want p' conveys that x wants 
not-p o When we embed a complement with a free degree-variable under want, 
then, the presupposition will generally not be fulfilled for all possible values of 
that variable. Suppose, e .g . ,  that I want the paper to be at least 5 pages long and 
no longer than 7, but I don't care whether it is 5 or 6 or 7. Then I want the paper 
to be d-Iong is true for values for d that are at or below 5, and false for values 
above 7, but neither true nor false for the ones in between (i.e . ,  above 5 and not 
above 7) . When we A-abstract over d, then, we get a partial function of type <d,t> 
which is undefined for the degrees in that middle zone. 
How do comparative operators like -er and less work in this 3 -valued 
semantics? Our old entries referred to the maximal degree of which P is true. In 
the bivalent setting, this is effectively the (sharp) border-line between the degrees 
that P is true of and the degrees that P is false of It could have been equivalently 
referred to as the maximal degree of which P is not false. Nothing we have said is 
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affected if we change the definition of maximum, which the entries for -er and 
less rely on, from (6) above to (3 5) below. 
(3 5) max(p) := the greatest lower bound (glb) of {d: P( d) = O }  
But see what we now get for the two LFs of sentence (34)c. 
(36) a. I want [[less than l Opp] the paper to be t long] 
b .  [less than 1 Opp] I want the paper to be t long 
(36)a means, as before, that the paper is less long than 1 0pp in every world which 
conforms to my desires. (It also now receives a presupposition, but one entailed 
by this assertion, which is indetectable . )  (36)b, however, now means that the glb 
of the lengths which I want the paper not to be is below l Opp. This glb is the 
maximal length that I tolerate (not the maximal length that I require) . So b is 
equivalent to a. 
2. 4. DegP-scope and de re/de dicto ambiguity 
Some of the older literature on comparatives took for granted that the famous 
Russell ambiguity in (37) was a matter ofDegP-scope. 
(37) John thinks the yacht is longer than it is . 
When the DegP scopes below the verb think, it was assumed, we get the 
contradictory-thought reading, and the sensible reading is due to the DegP 
scoping above think. Stechow ( 1 984) was the first to see clearly that this was a 
mistake. Analyzing examples like (3 8), he showed that a high-DegP LF would 
not only be an island violation, but also misrepresent the truth-conditions. 
(3 8) If Mary smoked less than she does, she would be healthier. 
We conclude with von Stechow that the Russell-ambiguity is a matter of de re or 
de dicto interpretation of the than-clause. There is merely a one-directional 
connection with DegP-scope : a de dicto interpretation of the than-clause is 
possible only if the DegP is in the scope of the relevant intensional verb, but a de 
re interpretation is compatible with either wide or narrow DegP-scope. 
To spell this out a bit more, I need to fill in a treatment of clausal 
complements to than (which I avoided in the examples so far) . Following 
standard practice, I take than-clauses to be derived by wh-movement of a covert 
operator from the degree-argument position of an adjective. The trace is 
interpreted as a variable over degrees. The wh-clause as a whole may be treated 
in analogy with a free relative, as a definite description of a maximal degree. 
(39) [wh] the bed is t] long] = max{d :  long(the bed,d)} 
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(39) in conjunction with our meaning for -er predicts that the sentence John is 
taller than the bed is long is true iff the (maximal) degree to which John is tall 
exceeds the (maximal) degree to which the bed is long. 
As for the de re/de dicto distinction, I assume that LF-representations 
contain explicit world-arguments for each predicate, and that the world-argument 
of the restrictor of a quantifier may, but need not, be bound locally. So even if we 
only consider narrow scope for the DegP, sentence (37) has two LFs, which differ 
in the choice of world-variable in the than-clause. 16 
(40) a. John thinkSw Aw' [[-er than wh it is t longw'] the yacht is t longw'] 
Vw' E Acc(w) : max{d :  longw'(y,d) } > max{d :  longw'(y,d) } 
b .  John thinkSw AW' [ [ -er than wh it is t longw] the yacht is t longw'] 
Vw' E Acc(w) : max{d :  longw'(y,d) } > max{d :  longw(y,d) } 
(40)a expresses the contradictory de dicto reading and (40)b the sensible de re 
reading. As we see here, both readings are compatible with narrow DegP-scope, 
and therefore, Russell ambiguites cannot be used as evidence for scopal mobility 
of DegPs. 17 
But notice that the ambiguities presented in the previous section were not 
Russell ambiguities . I deliberately have been using phrases after than that rigidly 
pick out degrees, so the issue of de re vs. de dicto didn't arise in the first place. 
Even though they are restricted to intensional contexts, the ambiguities we saw 
with exactry-differentials and less-comparatives cannot be explained away as 
involving de re without wide DegP-scope. 
We can, of course, contrive examples in which there are both DegP-scope 
and de re/de dicto ambiguities. 
(4 1 )  The box i s  required to be  less wide than it i s  tall . 
We expect three possible readings, and this is what we find. (4 1 )  can mean that, 
in order to satisfy the requirements, the box must be taller than wide. This 
reading is generated by leaving the DegP low and interpreting the than-clause de 
dicto. (4 1 )  can also mean that the box should be less wide than the height that it 
actually happens to be. On this reading, the requirements don't regulate the box's 
proportions, only its width. We obtain this interpretation by means of a low DegP 
and a de re than-clause. Finally, (4 1 )  can mean that the box isn't required to be as 
wide as its actual height. This reading has a high DegP and (therefore) a de re 
than-clause. There can be no such thing as a high-DegP, de dicto than-clause 
reading. In this respect, (4 1 )  contrasts with (42) . 
(42) The box is not required to be as wide as it is tall. 
Recall that when the than-phrase is rigid, the high-DegP reading of less coincides 
in meaning with the negation of the corresponding equative. Given a de re 
reading of the than or as-clause, the high-DegP reading of (4 1 )  is equivalent to 
(42) . But (42) also allows a reading not shared by (4 1 ), on which the as-clause is 
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de dicto : (42) can mean that it isn't required for the box to be as wide as tall (i .e . ,  
that it is allowed to be taller than wide) . These judgments may be too complex to 
build strong conclusions on. But if they are real, then we may also have an 
argument here against at least one version of a scope-splitting analysis, which 
would say that less is decomposed into negation and equative, and only the 
negation can outscope the intensional verb . 
3. DegP-scope and syntactic and semantic ellipsis 
3. 1. Syntactic ellipsis: VP-deletion 
A standard argument for QR (covert movement of DPs) is that it is neede� to 
license ellipsis in examples which on the surface suffer from antecedent 
containment (henceforth AC). For example, the deleted VP in (43)a seems to 
have an antecedent (the matrix VP) which contains it and therefore is not identical 
to it . 1 8 But after QR has applied, as in (43)b, AC is resolved and the two VPs 
match perfectly. 
(43)  a .  I read every book wh that you did rea6-t. 
b .  [every book wh that you did read--t] I read t 
A completely analogous argument can be put forward for covert DegP-movement. 
In the S S of (44)a, the deleted VP is contained in its antecedent, the matrix VP. If 
covert DegP movement applies as in (44)b, the result is a structure with no AC 
and properly matched VPs. 
(44) a. Mary ran faster than wh John did ruB t fast. 
b .  [-er than wh John did ruB t fast] Mary ran t fast 
The idea that DegP-movement is involved in licensing ellipsis in 
comparative clauses has a long tradition. 19 One recent argument in its favor was 
presented by Wold ( 1 995). Carlson ( 1 975) had observed that ACD in relative 
clauses is degraded when the head of the relative clause is a weak indefinite, 
especially an existentially read bare plural. 20 
(45) *John was climbing trees that Bill was. 
Diesing ( 1 992) explained this by her thesis that existential bare plurals do not QR, 
but remain inside VP to get bound by existential closure. Thus they cannot get 
out of the VP to resolve AC, and ellipsis cannot be licensed. But (as also noted 
by Carlson) existential bare plurals do allow ACD in comparative clauses. 
(46) a. John was climbing higher trees than Bill was. 
b. John was climbing more trees than Bill was. 
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Diesing left this as a potential challenge for her account . Wold showed that there 
is no problem if AC can also be resolved by DegP-movement instead of QR. 
(47) [ -er than wh Bill was elimbiag t high trees ] John was climbing t high trees 
The bare plurals in (46) can stay in VP, low enough to get caught by existential 
closure, while DegP moves high enough to license the ellipsis .  
In the first part of this paper, we found some semantic and syntactic 
constraints limiting where DegPs can move. If DegP-movement is indeed a 
prerequisite for ellipsis licensing, these constraints should affect the range of 
possible ellipses and their interpretations. Let us see whether that is true. 
One thing that we saw above was that DegP-movement cannot cross over 
a quantificational DP (Kennedy's generalization) . So what will happen if we 
construct an example in which, on the one hand, DegP must move out of VP to 
resolve AC, but on the other hand, there is an intervening DP-quantifier in that 
VP? (48) is a case in point. 
(48) John pushed every weight higher than Mary did .  
What we expect is that the only grammatical derivation will be one in which the 
DP every weight first moves out of the VP, so that then the DegP can also move 
out of VP without crossing over it . (It will only cross over its trace, which is 
fine.) So we get the LF in (49) . 
(49) every weight 1 [-er than wh Mary did J*tSh-4 t high12 John pushed tl t2 high 
(49) says that for every weight x, John pushed x higher than Mary pushed x. This 
is what the English sentence in (48) means, and indeed the only reading that it 
appears to have. The general prediction is that quantificational DPs must scope 
"out of the way" whenever they are in the path of a DegP containing an 
antecedent-contained elided VP. This has intricate empirical implications, which 
for the most part remain to be tested. For example, we predict an interference 
with sloppy-identity construals of pronouns in examples like (50). 
(50) I planted one of my trees deeper than you did. 
If we are on the right track, (50) should only allow a pragmatically odd reading: I 
planted one of my trees deeper than you planted that same tree. It is not obvious 
that this is correct, but also not easy to say what other readings are possible. More 
work is called for here.2 1 
We also observed that DegP doesn't scope over negation and other 
monotone decreasing items, since the resulting readings would systematically be 
presupposition failures. If DegP-movement is needed to resolve ACD, it follows 
that (5 1 )  is ungrammatical on any reading that takes the matrix VP headed by 
refuse to be the antecedent of the elided VP. 
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(5 1 )  *John refused to run faster than Mary did refuse to fUR t fast 
This is correct. (The only good reading for this surface string is that John refused 
to run faster than Mary ran. 22) However, it turns out that we would be making 
this correct prediction regardless of whether DegP-movement plays any role in 
ellipsis licensing. The reading indicated in (5 1 )  also involves a presupposition 
failure within the than-clause: there is no maximal degree d such that Mary 
refused to run d-fast. This in itself rules out the intended construal of the elided 
VP, independently of any assumptions about how ellipsis is licensed. So the 
judgment in (5 1 )  is merely consistent with the hypothesis that DegP-movement is 
needed for ellipsis licensing; it does not help support it . 
With those intensional verbs that we saw a DegP can cross, we get 
ambiguity of antecedent-size, as expected. (52) is from Williams ( 1 974) . 
(52) a. My father tells me to work harder than my boss does. 
b. My father tells me to work harder than my boss does 'NOrk t hard 
c. My f. tells me to work harder than my b.  does tell me to work t hard 
(53) a .  John needs to drive faster than Mary does. 
b. John needs to drive faster than Mary does drive t fast 
c. John needs to drive faster than Mary does Reed to drP/e t fast 
To bring out each of the two readings of (53), imagine two contexts. In the 
context for reading b, we are talking about what it takes for John to win the race. 
Here there is no absolute minimal requirement for the speed he needs to attain; 
what matters is that his speed exceed Mary's .  In the context for reading c, we are 
discussing John's and Mary's chances of making it to Ithaca by 8 pm tonight (at 
the latest) . Since John is currently 300 miles away from Ithaca, whereas Mary is 
only 200 miles away, the minimal speed for him to make it exceeds the minimal 
speed for her to make it . (Notice that there is no requirement here on their 
relative speeds.) 
Interestingly, this ambiguity of antecedent-choice carries over to examples 
with verbs which we found not to show truth-conditionally distinct high-DegP 
readings, like the neg-raising verb want. (54) is the variant of Williams' example 
analyzed in Sag ( 1 976) . 
(54) a. Mary's father wants her to work harder than her boss does. 
b. Mary's father wants her to work harder than her boss does work t hard 
c. M's fwants her to work harder than her b does y.r.aHt her to work t hard 
This indicates that DegP can, after all, scope over these verbs, and that the reason 
why we didn't see truth-conditional reflexes of this scoping (when looking at Jess­
DegPs) must be in their semantics. So we really need to work out the link 
between neg-raising behavior and lack of DegP-scope ambiguity that I sketched at 
the end of section 2 .3 . 
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Williams and Sag used these examples to point out a correlation between 
ellipsis and availability of de dicto readings. The non-elliptical (or less elliptical) 
(55) allows a de dicto reading of the than-clause that is not shared by its elliptical 
counterpart (52)c. 
(55) My father tells me to work harder than my boss tells me to.  
(55) can describe a state of affairs where my father tells me : "I don't care how 
many hours you work, but make sure it's more than whatever your boss demands. 
If he says you have to work 20 hours, work at least 2 1 ;  if he tells you to work 30, 
work 3 1 ;  etc. " (52)a cannot describe this scenario on any of its readings. The 
only reading it shares with (55) is a de re reading, where the embedded tell-clause 
is evaluated in the utterance world, not in the worlds conforming to what my 
father demands. I .e . ,  (52)c has to mean that my boss imposes a certain minimum 
requirement for how hard I have to work, and my father imposes another one 
which is higher than that . Williams and Sag took this fact to support the 
hypothesis that ellipsis-licensing depends on DegP-scope. They reasoned on the 
basis of a naIve identifcation of de re and de dicto with wide and narrow scope 
respectively. As we saw in 2 .4  above, this is not justified; there is only a one­
directional implication, namely that if the DegP's scope is wide, the than-clause 
must be read de re o But fortunately, it is only this direction of the connection that 
is required for their argument. If the DegP must scope over the matrix verb in 
order to license the broad construal of the ellipsis, then the than-clause gets 
carried along out of the matrix verb's scope and therefore can only be read de re o 
This is just what was observed. 
We can confirm the correlation between ellipsis-size and DegP-scope even 
more directly by changing Williams' kind of example to a variant with less. 
(56) Mary needs to drive less fast than John does Reed to diWe t fast 
When the elided VP is understood to be headed by need (as indicated), the DegP 
must scope over need, and the truth-conditions therefore are those of a negated 
equative ('she doesn't need to drive as fast he needs to drive') . This prediction is 
also correct. 
What have we learned in this section? There is more fieldwork to be done 
in the area where ACD in comparative clauses interacts with Kennedy's 
generalization. Apart from this, it appeared that our previous conclusions about 
DegP-movement were at least consistent with the view that ellipsis-licensing 
relies on DegP-movement. Our last set of facts, about DegP-scope and ellipsis­
size in examples with intensional verbs, showed moreover that this combination 
of assumptions makes some interesting correct predictions. It is difficult, 
however, to draw stronger conclusions at this point. We have not given any 
consideration to alternative hypotheses, which might account for ellipsis-licensing 
without appeal to DegP-movement. Before we examine concrete versions of such 
alternative theories, we cannot know whether they would have any difficulty 
making the same correct predictions also. 
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What such alternatives might there be? That depends, for one thing, on 
our background assumptions about VP-ellipsis in general . We have tacitly taken 
for granted here that an elided VP and its antecedent must have LFs that are 
identical up to possible differences in indices. 23 If we consider the possibility that 
some less restrictive parallelism condition might be sufficient, there may be ways 
to establish the required parallelism without DegP-movement.24 Even if we stick 
to the strict (near-)identity condition we have been assuming, it is not obvious that 
DegP-movement is the only way to resolve AC. What about moving the entire 
AP, as in (57)? 
(57) [[-er than wh John did R:lft-t] fast] Mary ran t 
For this to be a viable alternative, we would need appropriate interpretive 
mechanisms to deal with the AP-sized traces and their binding in this structure. It 
is not at all obvious what exactly these should be, how they would affect the 
reasoning in section 2, and whether this path in the end would lead to something 
substantively different from DegP-movement. 25 It is incumbent upon me to deal 
with these questions, but not in the space of this paper. 
3. 2. Semantic "ellipsis": superlatives and too 
As we just saw, it is difficult to make a strong argument for DegP-movement on 
the basis of facts about VP ellipsis, because one needs so many auxiliary 
assumptions. Part of the difficulty is that it is controversial just how this kind of 
ellipsis is licensed and how close the match between the missing VP and its 
antecedent has to be. To side-step this controversy, it would be useful if we could 
look at cases of what I will call here " semantic ellipsis " .  By this I mean a 
construction in which there aren't two parallel pieces of syntactic (LF) structure 
which stand in an anaphor-antecedent relation, but rather there is a single piece 
which however is used twice in the semantic calculation. Analyses of this kind 
have often been proposed as competitors for analyses in terms of syntactic 
ellipsis, notably for so-called Comparative Ellipsis26, but there we would be 
getting onto even more controversial ground. The constructions I will look at 
here are ones for which (to my knowledge, at least) a semantic-ellipsis analysis is 
the only kind of analysis on the market. 
Consider the superlative. 
(58) John screamed (the) loudest. 
(58) can be paraphrased by a comparative : John screamed louder than anyone 
else did. The LF of the comparative paraphrase contains two degree predicates, 
one in the matrix clause and one in the than-clause. The superlative has only a 
matrix clause and still manages to convey the same meaning. The following 
analysis reveals how. 27 
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(59) a. [-est] = AR<d,et> .AX. max{d :  R(x,d) } > max{d :  3y *- x: R(y,d) } 
b .  LF for (58) :  John [-estl [scream t l loud]] 
Notice that R (the denotation of -est's complement) is "used twice" in the 
calculation prescribed by entry (59)a. We use it to determine one set of degrees 
for John, and another one for everybody else. 
Recall now our example (53) (repeated here as (60)a) and compare it with 
the analogous superlative in (60)b. 
(60) a. John needs to drive faster than Mary does. 
b. John needs to drive fastest . 
The two readings we observed in (60)a are replicated in (60)b. Just amend the 
scenarios that I gave above to bring out each reading by the addition of a third 
person, say Bill . Then (60)b might mean that John needs to outdo both Mary and 
Bill (say, in order to win the race) . Or it might mean that the minimal speed that 
John needs (to get to Ithaca by 8 pm) is higher than the minimal speeds needed by 
Mary or Bill (since they are already nearer to Ithaca) . In the comparative example 
(60)a, the ambiguity clearly involved different-sized choices of antecedent for the 
VP-ellipsis .  On the view that ellipsis-licensing requires LF-identity - but not 
independently of this view - this implied that the two readings also differed in the 
scope of the DegP. In the superlative variant (60)b, there is no ellipsis to resolve. 
So how do we generate the analogous two readings? The obvious way - and here 
the only one available to us - is by scoping the DegP. As the reader can verify, if 
we scope -est below need, as in (6 1 )a, the entry in (59)a gives us the first reading, 
and if we scope it above, as in (6 1 )b, it gives us the second one. 
(6 1 )  a .  Johnl needs [t l -est2 to drive t2 fast] 
b .  John 1 -est2 needs [t l to drive t2 fast] 
Our analysis of the ambiguity in the superlative examples is parallel to our 
analysis for the comparative variant : in both cases, we invoke DegP-movement 
across the intensional verb to obtain the second reading. So what is new here, 
what do we learn from the superlative example that we haven't already learned 
from the comparative one? The new point is that the evidence for DegP­
movement needn't be contingent on assumptions about ellipsis-licensing. 
Whether or not you accept the relatively strict parallelism conditions on VP­
ellipsis that imply that DegP must be able to move above need in (60)a, you can't 
get around this movement if you want to account for all the readings of (60)b . 
For the same methodological reason, it ma� be useful to look at gradation 
constructions with so . . .  that, too, and enough. 8 These also seem to involve 
" semantic ellipsis" ,  in the sense that the material in the scope of the degree­
operator is used twice in the semantic calculation. For example, too tall roughly 
means 'taller than is compatible with certain (contextually given) goals or desires'. 
If John is too tall, he is taller than it is acceptable for him to be tall . Notice how 
the clause 'John (be) tall' appears twice in this paraphrase, once unmodalized to 
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the left of than, and another time under a possibility operator to its right. The 
following entry for too makes this transparent in the double occurrence ofP.29 
(62) [too]JW = A.P<s,dt>. max(P(w)) > max { d: :3W' E Acc(w) : P(w')(d) = I }  
Consider now an example like (63) .  
(63) John needs (to have) too much money. 
(63) has one reading where it means that what John needs is to have too much 
money. Imagine he is the type of person who only feels secure when he has more 
money than he can spend. Unless he has too much money (for him to spend), his 
(emotional) needs are not satisfied. But (63 )  also has another reading, where it 
means that John's financial needs are too high. Imagine that he has many 
financial obligations (mortgage, alimony, gambling debts, . . .  ) .  He considers 
taking a job as a linguistics professor, but thinks better of it, since his needs 
regarding salary are too high. He needs too much money for him to be a linguist . 
These two readings differ in the contextually supplied accessibility 
relation for the implicit possibility operator associated with too, but that is not 
their only difference. They also differ in the scope of too with respect to need. 
For the first reading, the LF in (64)a is adequate, but for the second one, it must 
be as in (64)b. 
(64) a. Johnl needs [to02 [t l to have t2 much money]] 
Vw E Accneed: max{d :  j has d-much money in w} > 
max { d: :3w' E Acctoo{w) : j has d-much money in WI } 
b .  to02 [John 1 needs [t l to have t2 much money] ] 
max{d:  Vw E ACCneed: j has d-much money in w} > 
max{d :  :3w E Acctoo : Vw' E Accneerl...w) : j has d-much money in WI } 
ACCneed is meant to pick out the worlds in which John's needs are met. Acctoo is 
different for each reading. For the intended interpretation of (64)a, let's say it 
maps each w to the set of worlds which are like w in the respects that determine 
spending limits and in which John spends all his money. So (64)a says that John's 
needs are met only if he has more money than for him to have is compatible with 
him spending it all . For the intended interpretation of (64)b, let Acctoo map each 
w to the set of worlds in which people obey the laws in effect in w (without 
starving) and in which John is a linguist . Then (64)b says that John's financial 
needs are greater than for them to be is compatible with him being a linguist .  The 
important point for our purposes is that what is incompatible with being a linguist 
is not having lots of money, but needing lots of money. This is why we need to 
scope too over need in order to capture this second reading properly. 
Due to the multiple layers of modality and concomitant context­
dependency, the analysis of this type of example is rather complex. Still, I think 
we can isolate the contribution that is made by the degree operator's scope in 
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relation to the intensional verb . If so, then we have another way here of detecting 
DegP-scope without taking a stand on licensing-principles for syntactic ellipsis .  
4. Conclusion 
We have probed the scopal behavior of degree quantifiers, using direct evidence 
from truth-conditional ambiguity as well as more indirect evidence from the 
interpretation of elided material. The argumentation was incomplete and tentative 
in a number of places, but suppose the picture that began to emerge is right. Then 
DegPs are mobile, but they are not allowed to cross over quantificational DPs. 
This appears to be a syntactic constraint of some kind, because the prohibited 
scopings would not in any way be semantically deviant. And if our treatment of 
ellipsis licensing is right, it is not a constraint on the absolute length of movement, 
since non-quantificational DPs in the same domains (including QR-traces of 
quantifiers) can be crossed over. Rather it is a constraint that specifically targets 
interveners of a certain kind. The situation is thus highly reminiscent of the 
intervention effects in wh-questions studied by Beck ( 1 996), although the precise 
connections remain to be explored. More data need to be investigated to decide 
whether the parallel really holds up. And most importantly, we need to work out 
a syntactic analysis in which the observed constraint has principled reasons. 
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IThis is probably wrong. For arguments that extraposition marks scope, see 
Williams ( 1 974), Gueron & May ( 1 984), and Fox & Nissenbaum (2000) . The task 
of integrating those authors' insights with the results of the present paper is left for 
the future. 
2 I treat degrees as a separate basic type (label 'd') . 
3This is not the pegP of Abney, Kennedy, and other proponents of the "DegP 
hypothesis" . For them, AP is an argument of Deg, whereas my DegP is an 
argument of A. 
4Abbreviations : tall(x,d) := x is tall to degree d. j := John. 
5This whole section closely follows the reasoning in Kennedy ( 1 997) . 2 . 1 and 2 .2 
more or less just replicate his examples, arguments, and conclusions. 2 . 3  and 2 .4 
contain differing facts and conclusions, but even there I will mostly mimic his 
logic of argument. 
�at about infinite domains? If there were infinitely many girls, there might be 
no shortest ones and/or no tallest ones. In that case, the maxima referred to in 
( l O)b or ( 1 2)b are undefined. So my real claim, more accurately, is that pairs like 
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( 1 0) and ( 1 2) are equivalent whenever these maxima are defined. For my 
methodological point, this qualification makes no difference. 1 assume (see right 
below) that the high-DegP LF is automatically ruled out when its interpretation 
refers to an undefined maximum. So even if we consider universal and existential 
quantifiers with infinite domains, there can be no detectable scope' ambiguity. 
7This is assuming the (standard) 'at least'-interpretation of equatives, on which 
Mary is as tall as John is true (though under-informative) when she is actually 
taller than him. A suitable meaning-rule for equative DegPs analogous to (5)a is :  
IPs as one foot] = AP. max(p) � 1 ' . As for exactly-equatives, see 2.2 below. 
8 Abbreviations : p := the paper. longw(x,d) := x is long to degree d in world w. 
Acc(w) := the set of worlds accessible from w. The world argument of Acc is 
suppressed when it is the utterance world. 
9This way of ruling out reading c admittedly depends on the specific semantics for 
-er that I chose, which makes reference to maximality. (Maximalization in the 
interpretation of the than-clause is standard - see von Stechow 1 984, Rullmann 
1 995b, but in the matrix clause it is not .) 
lOThe set {d :  I {x :  girl(x) & tall(x,d) } 1  = 2}  in (20)c fails to be an initial segment of 
the set of all heights whenever there are more than 2 girls, because it does not 
contain the degrees to which the third-tallest girl is tall . The constraint in 
question is needed to account for what Kennedy calls "cross-polar anomaly" . 
I IThis formulation is intended to allow DPs that take scope inside an argument of 
the graded adjective. In (i)a,b, the underlined DPs can have narrower scope than 
DegP, but since they don't intervene between the DegP and its trace, they are not 
counterexamples to Kennedy's generalization. 
(i) a. Every student showed up less often than that. 
'it happened less often than that that every student showed up' 
b .  An earthquake is more likely than a snowstorm. 
The only potentially genuine counterexamples to (27) that 1 could come up with 
involve indefinite complements to adjectives of distance, as in (ii) . 
(ii) Jaffrey is closer to an airport than it is to a train station. 
12Stateva talks about superlatives with least, but the point is the same. 
13See e.g. Jacobs ( 1 980), Rullmann ( 1 995), Larson et al . ( 1 997), de Swart ( 1 999) . 
141 have no story about (33)  at this point, but 1 hope that it may tum out to be 
covered by a general analysis of epistemic modals, which apparently always seek 
widest scope. See von Fintel & latridou (2000) . 
1 5This is like the "homogeneity presupposition" of von Fintel ( 1 997) . 
16The free variable w here stands for the utterance world (the evaluation world for 
the whole sentence) . The idea that quantifiers can have narrow scope even when 
their restrictors are interpreted de re is widely accepted nowadays, not just for 
comparatives but (especially) for DP-quantifiers. Abusch ( 1 994), for example, 
makes this point about an example like If every senator were a rancher instead, 
I'd be happy (which is transparently parallel to von Stechow's (3 8)) . See also 
Percus (2000). 
171n later work ( 1 993, 1 998), von Stechow reversed his earlier position and 
decided that (40)b was not, after all, sufficient to capture the sensible reading of 
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(3 7) . The problem he saw is that (40)b has a comparison in the complement of 
think, but intuitively the thought reported by (37) need not have a comparative 
content. E.g. , John might just be thinking "the yacht is 1 4' long" (when in fact it 
is 1 3 '  long) . I don't see the force of this objection (at least not given the semantics 
I am assuming here) . (40)b just says that in every doxastic alternative of John's, 
the yacht is longer than it is in the actual world. This is true if he thinks it is 14' 
long. Despite its form, (40)b does not actually say he has a comparative thought. 
1 81 use strike-out to represent an elided VP with a certain intended interpretation. 
19See Bresnan ( 1 973), Sag ( 1 976), among others. 
2°There is some doubt about the correctness of Carlson's descriptive 
generalization. According to Pesetsky (pc), at least some examples of this sort 
improve with the addition of too in the elliptical clause. This may undermine 
Wold's argument. 
2 1To make sense of the facts in this area, it will be necessary, for one thing, to take 
a systematic look at the behavior of quantifiers inside the than-clause. There are 
well-known puzzles here, and a recent paper by Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 
compellingly argues that they can only be solved if we change some of the basic 
assumptions that I have unquestioningly taken over from the literature. 
Obviously, I need to make my reasoning consistent with their insights somehow, 
and before I manage to do this, there is reasonable doubt as to whether this paper 
is even asking the right questions. 
22This is a reading where the elided VP is headed by run and is interpreted de re . 
I .e . ,  we are saying about Mary's actual speed that John refused to surpass it . It 
may be marginally possible also to get a de dicto reading, meaning that John 
refused to outrun Mary. That reading is easier if the auxiliary is changed from did 
to would, or (even better) if we switch to the Comparative Ellipsis variant with no 
auxiliary at all . 
23See Rooth ( 1 992) and work based on that for more detail on the assumptions 
about ellipsis licensing that underlie this requirement. 
2�.g. , it may suffice to move just the than-clause or the wh-clause after than: 
(i) [wh John did fUn t fast] Mary ran [-er than t] fast 
The VPs are still not identical here, but AC is resolved. And as Kennedy (pc) 
points out, the existential closures of the two VPs are semantically equivalent 
(Ax.:ld [x ran d-fast] = Ax.:ld [x ran faster than d]), which suffices for ellipsis­
licensing according to a recent proposal by Merchant ( 1 999) . But this idea runs 
into a problem with differential phrases, as in Mary ran 5 kmlh faster than John 
did, where the analogous equivalence fails. (Ax.:ld[x ran d-fast] :f:. Ax.:ld [x 
ran 5 km/h faster than d]) . 
250ne proposal for interpreting structures like (57) is worked out in Kennedy 
( 1 997) . I will discuss this on another occasion. 
26See e.g. the "direct analysis" phrasal comparatives in Heim ( 1 985), and similar 
analyses for CE as well as related constructions like Bare Argument Ellipsis and 
Gapping that were defended by Reinhart & Rooth ( 1 986), Reinhart ( 1 989), 
Kennedy ( 1 997), and others. See also Lechner ( 1 999) for critical discussion. 
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27Heim ( 1 985) .  In Heim ( 1 999), I propose a variant that makes the semantic type 
the same as for the comparative and equative DegPs (by eliminating the external 
argument) . This amendment would not affect the present reasoning. 
28See Meier (2000) for a detailed investigation and semantic analysis of these 
constructions. 
29The same point still holds when we consider examples where too selects a jor­
infinitival . The for-clause supplies an explcit restrictor for the modal operator 
introduced by too, but it does nothing to spell out its nuclear scope. So we still 
need to use DegP's sister twice, as shown in the following rule for too + (for-)CP . 
(i) [too cP]W = 
AP. max(p(w» > max{d :  ::Iw' E Acc(w) : [Cp]W' = 1 & P(w')(d) = I } 
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